International arbitration is an important area of federal jurisdiction and federal legislative competence, and has attracted significant policy attention in Australia. This paper undertakes a study of pro-arbitration judicial policy in recent arbitration-related Australian case law which touches upon the continuing applicability of the controversial 1999 Eisenwerk decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal. Against this pro-arbitration judicial policy context, this paper reviews five Eisenwerk-related cases handed down between 2010 and 2012. It concludes that despite pro-arbitration judicial policy being embedded as a requirement of reasoning in decisions under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth), there is mixed evidence of such policy in the cases surveyed. This paper concludes that the extent to which this policy is evidenced largely corresponds with the degree to which contemporary decisions have departed from Eisenwerk.
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ government's policy platform, the purposive approach to statutory interpretation, the core ideas underpinning the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 20 ('New York Convention') and aspects of the promotional and operational work of the Australian judiciary.
In essence, this paper uses the term pro-arbitration judicial policy as a term of artdescribing a judicial approach to arbitration-related case law which is international in perspective and moreover sophisticated, to the point that the court's demonstrated and high-level understanding of the arbitral process truly supports rather than frustrates it. Pro-arbitration judicial policy is not merely minimal court intervention 21 -rather, contextually appropriate court intervention. 22
A
Federal government policy -promoting Australia as a regional centre for international commercial arbitration Pro-arbitration policy (in a general sense) is an element of the current federal government's policy platform. Overall 'low levels of [international commercial arbitration] activity' has been a matter of 'concern' amongst Australian policy makers. 23 The federal government's policy, by way of response, is to promote Australia as a regional centre for international commercial arbitration.
This policy position had its genesis in the Attorney-General's announcement on 21 November 2008 of a review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (the 'IAA'). This is the key piece of federal legislation regulating international commercial arbitration in Australia. At this time, the Attorney-General stated that the federal government was 'committed to developing Australia as a regional hub for international commercial dispute resolution'. 24 The Discussion Paper released that day asserted that '[t]his review will ensure that the [IAA] best supports international arbitration in Australia'. 25 To this end, the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) was passed, making several amendments to the IAA. In the same year, the federal government (with the New South Wales government) assisted in establishing the Australian International Disputes Centre in Sydney. 26 27 This activity represents a form of pro-arbitration policy at a political level. However, what is of more imminent interest for the purposes of this paper is the extent to which judicial decision-making in arbitration-related case law is consistent with the government's policy position. It is this degree of consistency which will inform this paper's assessment of pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is described above.
B
The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) -A purposive interpretation It might be queried why this case law should be consistent with government policy. The strict separation of judicial power from the executive and the Parliament is a key feature of the separation of powers in Australia as expounded in the Boilermakers' Case. 28 The starting point for this analysis is the interpretative methodology that must be applied by the courts to the IAA. An analysis of this methodology confirms that proarbitration judicial policy, understood as courts supporting the arbitral process by demonstrating an internationally minded and sophisticated understanding of arbitration, is a legitimate element of legal reasoning in the application of that statute.
It is proper for Australian courts to approach arbitration-related litigation on the basis of pro-arbitration judicial policy because the IAA is facilitative legislation 29 and the purposive approach to statutory interpretation requires interpretation against that context. The purposive approach also stands to secure more consistent interpretation of the IAA across the various State and federal courts having jurisdiction with respect to the Act. Such consistency has been emphasised by the High Court in the 'very stringent test' 30 31 -whereby intermediate courts ' should not depart from decisions … in another jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation … unless they are convinced that the interpretation is plainly wrong'. 32 The purposive approach to statutory interpretation is, at the Commonwealth level, embodied in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. According to this provision, 'the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other interpretation.' Applying this provision to the IAA, the Act's purposes should inform its construction. Following the coming into force of the International Arbitration 36 That provision requires courts to consider the IAA's objects when undertaking various tasks under the Act. 37 These tasks include deciding whether to enforce an award, 38 performing functions pursuant to art 6 of the Model Law 39 and performing any other functions with respect to the IAA, the Model Law, or any agreement or award to which the IAA applies. 40 These tasks also include interpretation of the IAA and the Model Law, 41 and the interpretation of an agreement or award to which the IAA applies. 42 Further, courts are required not only to consider the IAA's objects but also take into account two further 'fact[s]' 43 -that 'arbitration is an efficient, impartial, enforceable and timely method by which to resolve commercial disputes', 44 and that 'awards are intended to provide certainty and finality'. 45 The whole rationale of the Act, and thus the public policy of Australia, is to enforce such awards wherever possible in order to uphold contractual arrangements entered into in the course of international trade, in order to support certainty and finality in international dispute resolution and in order to meet the other objects specified in s 2D of the Act. 47 By broadening the range of considerations beyond the IAA's objects per se, and requiring courts to take them into account in relation to functions other than the interpretation of the IAA, the new IAA s 39 operates as an extension on the purposive approach that would otherwise apply by virtue of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. It thereby embeds pro-arbitration judicial policy as a legitimate element of judicial reasoning in the application of the IAA. In applying the IAA, courts are legally required to approach it in a way that is internationally-minded and facilitates arbitration. A sophisticated understanding of arbitration itself is integral to satisfying this requirement.
explained in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd
An additional layer of analysis also supports the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy under Australian law. The IAA implements the terms of the New York Convention into domestic law. 48 The Convention contains mechanisms designed to ensure the enforceability of international arbitration agreements 49 New York Convention art II. Pursuant to art II(1) of the New York Convention, the courts of Contracting States are required to recognise arbitration agreements and pursuant to art II(3) of the New York Convention they must (at the request of a party) refer matters within the scope of valid arbitration agreements back to arbitration. 50 Ibid arts III-IV. Article III of the New York Convention requires the courts of Contracting States to recognise international arbitration awards as binding and enforce them; art IV concerns evidentiary requirements for enforcement; and arts V-VI concern the grounds on which recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied or adjourned.
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ international arbitration rests', 51 while Lord Mustill has gone so far as to suggest that it 'perhaps could lay claim to be the most effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of commercial law'. 52 If a statute transposes the text of a treaty or a provision of a treaty into the statute so as to enact it as part of domestic law, the prima facie legislative intention is that the transposed text should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute as it bears in the treaty. To give it that meaning, the rules applicable to the interpretation of treaties must be applied to the transposed text and the rules generally applicable to the interpretation of domestic statutes give way. 60 Pursuant to art 31(1) of the VCLT (with emphasis added), ' [a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. Further, art 32 of the VCLT provides that recourse may be had to supplementary materials to either confirm the meaning that would result from an application of art 31 of the VCLT, or in circumstances where that interpretation 'leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure' or 'leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable'. As further explored in Brennan CJ was in the minority, however all five justices agreed on the interpretative principle relevant here. 
C
The New York Convention -pro-enforcement bias at the heart of the global arbitration regime Section B explored the interpretative methodologies surrounding the IAA and why these should lead to the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy in Australia. However, the analysis need not be so parochial. Pro-arbitration judicial policy is a phenomenon rooted in the very essence of the modern legal framework for regulating international commercial arbitration, built around the New York Convention.
The New York Convention's importance in the present context lies in the fact that its purposes are 'to promote international commerce and the settlement of international disputes through arbitration' 61 and 'to make it easier to enforce foreign awards'. 62 64 These purposes manifest themselves in what has been termed the New York Convention's 'pro-enforcement bias'. 65 This is a phrase employed not only in the literature but also in local 66 and international 67 case law. This pro-enforcement bias is not strictly identical to pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is used in this paper -the latter (as described above) is wider; the former is concerned with the specific issue of promoting the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ remove preexisting obstacles to enforcement'. 69 The Convention's pro-enforcement bias is often cited in the context of narrowly reading the art V New York Convention grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement 70 and in particular the public policy exception. 71 It also manifests itself in the proposition that awards are 'prima facie liable to be enforced' 72 under the New York Convention regime. However, reasoning which utilises the narrower pro-enforcement bias concept is necessarily consistent with the idea of pro-arbitration judicial policy. To borrow terminology from the criminal law field, it might be called a 'lesser included'. 73 The legal basis for Section B's analysis lay in Australian statutory interpretation methodologies. In discussing the legal basis for the New York Convention's proenforcement bias, reference is often made to the VCLT. The substance of arts 31(1) and 32 of the VCLT were introduced in Section B. Both provisions ostensibly support a proenforcement bias interpretation of the New York Convention.
The problem in a formal sense with this analysis is that it overlooks the VCLT's non-retroactivity. Pursuant to art 4 of the VCLT, its rules 'appl[y] only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States'. The VCLT came into force on 27 January 1980. However, the New York Convention was opened for signature on 19 June 1958 and came into force on 7 June 1959. Therefore, strictly, the VCLT is irrelevant to the New York Convention's interpretation at international law.
Nevertheless, the necessity of interpreting the Convention in light of its proenforcement bias is confirmed through an alternate avenue of analysis -customary international law. The first part of art 4 of the VCLT reads '[w]ithout prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the Convention …' The interpretative rules in arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT are in fact codifications of the principles otherwise applicable at customary international law. 74 Thus while arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT are strictly inapplicable in themselves, the rules they embody apply and exist independently of their codification in treaty form. The position remains that the New York Convention should be interpreted according to its pro-enforcement bias (which is In the criminal law context, a 'lesser included' offence is '[a] crime that is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of a more serious crime and … is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime' -Bryan Garner (ed), Black's Law Dictionary (West, 9 th ed, 2009) 1187. 
D
The Australian judiciary -spreading the good word Reorienting the analysis away from judicial decision-making itself, pro-arbitration judicial policy is reflected in the extra-judicial activities of a growing number of Australian judges as well as in the organisational structures becoming embedded within the Australian courts.
Some members of the judiciary have expressed concern at recent civil procedure reforms which seek to entrench alternative dispute resolution ('ADR') in the dispute resolution process. 75 Through the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth), parties to disputes in the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court 76 are required to each file a 'genuine steps statement' 77 which outlines 'the steps that have been taken to try to resolve the issues in dispute between the applicant and the respondent in the proceedings' or alternatively 'the reasons why no such steps were taken'. 78 The intention behind these procedures is to encourage dispute resolution outside of formal court structures 79 and '[i]n many cases, some form of ADR would be a genuine step appropriate for parties to consider'. 80 Critics have queried the utility of the legislation -with Justice Steven Rares of the Federal Court asking '[w]hy should people be stopped from coming to court because some law says you're not entitled to it' and noting 'particularly useless' disputes that can arise over what a genuine steps statement is. 81 Such concern has not surfaced with respect to promoting the arbitration of international commercial disputes. Australian judges have instead actively supported development of the local international commercial arbitration market. Historically jealous guardians of their jurisdiction, 82 judges now appreciate the importance of an integrated dispute resolution framework 83 77 Ibid ss 6, 7 (with respect to applicants and respondents, respectively). 78 Ibid ss 6(2)(a)-(b) (with respect to applicants). Respondents' statements must either indicate agreement with the applicants' statement or 'the respect in which, and reasons why, the respondent disagrees' -ibid s 7(2). The Supreme Court of Victoria, for example, 'sees itself as a … real partner with the providers of … ADR services' -Chief Justice Marilyn Warren, 'Remarks at the
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ It is therefore unsurprising that a number of prominent Australian judges actively promote the idea of international commercial arbitration in Australia through seminars, speeches and conference presentations around the world. To take just a few examples, Chief Justice Marilyn Warren and Justice Clyde Croft, both of the Supreme Court of Victoria, have acted in this capacity over recent years, 85 as has the recentlyappointed High Court Justice Patrick Keane in his former office as Chief Justice of the Federal Court. 86 In addition, international commercial arbitration is being actively facilitated by Australian courts through their organisational structures. At issue here is the development of specialised arbitration lists dealing with international commercial arbitration matters, such as the 'benchmark' 87 The rationale for arbitration lists lies in the observation that 'by having all arbitration matters brought in a specialist list … and heard by select judges experienced in arbitration, a body of jurisprudence will develop which is consistent, reliable and arbitration friendly'. 89 Croft J of the Supreme Court of Victoria identifies several benefits of specialist arbitration lists, namely that:
 courts with specialist lists are 'likely to be more aware of the specific issues that arise in the arbitration context';  'a consistent body of arbitration related decisions can be developed by judges that have an interest and expertise in arbitration'; and  the 'procedures to be applied [can be made] clear and easily accessible'. 90 It can thus be seen that the existence of and justification for specialised arbitration lists is closely tied in with the execution of pro-arbitration judicial policy as that term is described as an element of legal reasoning in Sections B and C above.
III
EISENWERK, THE MODEL LAW AND 'OPTING OUT'
Manifestation of the pro-arbitration judicial policy analysed in Part II, with respect to case law having a bearing on the continued applicability of Eisenwerk, is assessed in Part IV. Before that assessment is undertaken, some remarks can be made about If the parties to an arbitration agreement have (whether in the agreement or in any other document in writing) agreed that any dispute that has arisen or may arise between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with the Model Law, the Model Law does not apply in relation to the settlement of that dispute.
As a result of IAA s 16(1), the Model Law is given 'the force of law in Australia'. Therefore, considering the effect of IAA s 16(1) together with its old s 21, the Model Law operated as would be described by the law and economics movement as a set of 'default rules'. 92 The Model Law provided a default regulatory regime for international commercial arbitrations seated in Australia. However, it was open to the parties to agree (in writing) to subject themselves to a different body of law to govern the arbitration. 
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ There is nothing inherently insidious about the operation of IAA s 16(1) in conjunction with its old s 21 per se. To the contrary -procedural flexibility is a hallmark feature of international commercial arbitration. Thus the similar opt-out mechanism in Singapore's arbitration legislation was amended, rather than discarded, after a controversial and Eisenwerk-like interpretation in John Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corp (Japan). 93 The importance of procedural flexibility is recognised not only in the international commercial arbitration literature but is also empirically confirmed by research conducted through the School of International Arbitration. Its 2006 study found that procedural flexibility was 'the most widely recognised advantage' of arbitration amongst its respondents. 94 Similarly, the School's 2008 study found that procedural flexibility was an advantage of arbitration that 'most counsel spoke of'. 95 Further, the Redfern & Hunter commentary specifically adverts to the possibility that parties to an international commercial arbitration seated in one State may wish to subject themselves to a foreign lex arbitri -however unwise or inadvisable such a decision might be. 96 Opt-out mechanisms exist in the arbitration laws of other prominent arbitral seats in the region, such as Singapore (as mentioned above), 97 and the current lack of an opt-out provision in the IAA was recently noted by Chief Justice Patrick Keane of the Federal Court at the 6 th Annual AMTAC Address. 98 The reason that Eisenwerk 'caused instant consternation' 99 throughout the Australian arbitration community was not so much a consequence of these provisions' existence, but rather the interpretation Eisenwerk placed on the old IAA s 21. Applying that provision, Eisenwerk held that 'by expressly opting for one well-known form of arbitration, the parties sufficiently showed an intention not to adopt or be bound by any quite different system of arbitration, such as the Model Law'. 100 The 'form of arbitration' referred to in Eisenwerk was the parties' adoption of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 101 102 Much has been written about Eisenwerk and the error its reasoning committed in treating a choice of procedural rules (clearly foreseen and accommodated by art 19(1) of the Model Law) as evidencing an intention to displace the Model Law 103 -essentially that it 'seemed to conflate' contractually agreed-upon arbitration rules with the applicable lex arbitri. 104 In doing so, Eisenwerk lacks pro-arbitration judicial policy as defined by failing to adopt an internationally minded perspective or a sophisticated understanding of international commercial arbitration. It is not the intention or purpose of this paper to revisit the question of whether Eisenwerk was rightly decided, which has been exhaustively considered in the literature and has been answered with a resounding 'no'. 105 Rather, what is of contemporary significance are the cases which between 2010 and the time of writing have followed -and what is of particular interest given current federal government policy is the extent to which their reasoning displays evidence of pro-arbitration judicial policy.
These cases are, of course, only a subset of the (growing) corpus of recent Australian arbitration-related case law. For practical reasons, that entire body of case law cannot be analysed here. For the purposes of this paper, the Eisenwerk line of cases are a useful and interesting illustration of the pro-arbitration judicial policy concept at work (or not). They are a self-contained sample of cases running along a consistent theme that provide an informative basis for this paper's analysis.
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IV THE END OF EISENWERK? -A CASE STUDY IN PRO-ARBITRATION JUDICIAL POLICY
In this Part, five cases having a bearing on the continued applicability of Eisenwerk are analysed for evidence of this pro-arbitration judicial policy. 111 The respondent in the arbitration and the plaintiff in the litigation (Cargill International) sought to challenge the award, raising bases for doing so under both the now-repealed Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s 38(4)(b) and art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. 112 In determining this challenge, Ward J was required to identify which regime governed the arbitration, 113 and thus to reassess the Queensland Court of Appeal's reasoning in Eisenwerk.
Ward J relevantly held that the parties' arbitration clause was distinguishable from the clause in Eisenwerk, but in the event this analysis was wrong, her Honour went on to hold that:
 the parties' arbitration agreement did not enliven the old IAA s 21; and  Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be followed. 114 and second, that there is a distinction between the procedural rules governing an arbitration and the lex arbitri, 117 not properly appreciated by Eisenwerk, such that the decision was plainly wrong and should not be followed. 118 The pro-arbitration judicial policy underlying this decision can be seen in the Court's efforts to reach a conclusion regarding Eisenwerk which paid due regard to the Model Law's internal structure 119 and which was informed by the relevant academic literature. While her Honour emphasised that this literature merely 'confirms the view I would in any event have formed', 120 a number of local and international commentaries concerning Eisenwerk were referred to. 121 Ward J's decision rejects a feature of Australian arbitration jurisprudence which, as outlined in Part III above, was widely perceived as undesirable. For example, the then federal Attorney-General the Hon Robert McClelland MP remarked in a December 2009 speech that 'I am sure no one here needs reminding of the impact that the Eisenwerk decision has had on Australia's reputation internationally'. 122 To this extent, it 'demonstrates a mature understanding of international commercial arbitration' 123 and has a pro-arbitration effect consistent with the implementation of pro-arbitration judicial policy. 124 126 The parties' motivation for litigating appears to have been their desire to clarify 'the applicable supervisory law' so as to support 'the efficacious conduct of the arbitration' and to ensure the parties 'know at an early stage of the arbitration their rights of judicial review of any award'. 127 Cargill International, discussed in Section A above, is a good illustration of how these rights of recourse can differ depending on the applicable regime.
B
Wagners -The Queensland Court of Appeal
Unlike Ward J, the Queensland Court of Appeal was not so ready to declare Eisenwerk wrongly decided. Instead, it took a radically different view of the nature of the Eisenwerk holding, and confined the decision to its facts. It held that the Eisenwerk 'principle' was 'in truth, no principle at all'. 128 Rather, the Court viewed Eisenwerk's conclusion as one relating to the construction of the particular contractual terms at issue in that case. 129 The Court justified this view by pointing out that conclusions as to the construction of contractual terms in one case do not necessarily bind courts in future cases even when considering identical terms, given that contractual interpretation is a task undertaken in context. 130 Wagners can be viewed as manifestly lacking the pro-arbitration judicial policy underpinning Cargill International. The Court treated the key issue as entirely one of contractual interpretation. In Muir JA's assessment, 'whether the parties have agreed that any dispute between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with the Model Law depends on the construction of [the arbitration agreement]'. 131 While contractual interpretation is part of the jigsaw, it is not the only puzzle piece at play. Equally, analysing opt out issues under the old IAA s 21 involves the meaning of that provision -that is, statutory interpretation. That question is one of law, with relevant case law thus carrying precedential effect. The implications of this point were not adequately addressed by the Court. In addition, while it is true that contractual interpretation is a task undertaken in context, there are areas of the law where precedential value is ascribed to the interpretation of contractual terms for policy reasons -for example, in construing terms found in insurance contracts. The requirements of pro-arbitration judicial policy could arguably dictate a similar approach be taken to the construction of arbitration agreements. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows, the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not; of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change. 134 And thirdly, statutory interpretation is inescapably tied up with the notion of proarbitration judicial policy. This was demonstrated in Part II above. In international law, the New York Convention must be interpreted in accordance with its pro-enforcement bias and more broadly, interpretation of the IAA by Australian courts is legally required to occur in accordance with pro-arbitration judicial policy. This is so given the new IAA ss 2D and 39 inserted by the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), but is also the result that would be required under the purposive approach to statutory interpretation enshrined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA.
Thus, some authors describe Wagners as 'arbitration-unfriendly'. 135 Megens and Cubitt go so far as to suggest that '[o]ne would query why any arbitration practitioner, given the choice, would want to have an arbitration seated in Queensland'. 136 While not in so many words, what these concerns essentially reflect is the decision's lack of pro-arbitration judicial policy. However, not all assessments of Wagners have been critical. Rudge and Miles suggest that taken together, Cargill International and Wagners 'will perhaps go some way towards repairing the damage international observers have perceived'. 137 Whilst acknowledging Wagners did not 'go as far as' Cargill International, these authors suggest the decision 'is nevertheless encouraging' 138 and that taken together with Cargill International the cases 'represent a statement to the international arbitral community … that Australia's judiciary is arbitration friendly'. 139 Consequently, Rudge and Miles 'commend these decisions to the reader'. 140 On balance, it is difficult to accept the view that Wagners expresses 'opposition to the conclusion drawn … in Eisenwerk'. 141 Rather, the decision sidesteps the important statutory interpretation dimension of the old IAA s 21's operation, and in doing so escapes the need to comment on Eisenwerk's correctness. For this reason, the preferable _____________________________________________________________________________________ 132 Ibid. 133 [1970] 1 Ch 345. 134 Ibid 402. 135 Megens and Cubitt, 'Emerging Trends', above n 19, 38. 136 Ibid 41. See also Monichino, '2010 / 2011 Review', above n 18, 220. 137 Rudge and Miles, above n 103, 43. 138 Ibid 51. 139 Ibid 53. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid.
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C
Lightsource -The ACT Supreme Court
Lightsource concerned a dispute between Lightsource, an Australian software reseller, and Pointsec, a Swedish software developer. 143 145 The parties had included a dispute resolution clause (cl 12.8) in their contract. 146 That clause provided for the arbitration of any disputes in Sweden through the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, using the SCC Expedited Rules. 147 Swedish law was the contract's governing law. 148 Pointsec sought to have the ACT Supreme Court litigation stayed on the basis of this clause. 149 It also sought to have service of the originating application set aside, 150 though as this point turned purely on the application of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) it is not considered any further by this paper.
Pointsec's claim that cl 12.8 justified a stay of proceedings was put on four different and alternative bases:
 section 7 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) -which is the domestic implementation of the obligation of Australian courts to stay proceedings in the face of a valid arbitration agreement contained in art II(3) of the New York Convention;  article 8 of the Model Law -which is the equivalent provision requiring a stay of proceedings found in the Model Law;  section 53 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1986 (ACT) -which provides for staying litigation in the context of domestic commercial arbitration; and ____________________________________________________________________________________  the Court's 'inherent power and jurisdiction to stay proceedings before it'. 151 For the purpose of this paper's analysis, the key element of Lightsource relates to its application of art 8 of the Model Law. It is the Court's consideration of the Model Law art 8 argument that caused it to have reference to Eisenwerk and which is also most interesting for the purposes of analysing pro-arbitration judicial policy. While the Court noted the 'very similar terms' upon which art 8 of the Model Law and IAA s 7 operated, 152 the Court's decision relating to IAA s 7 turned on a contractual interpretation issue relating to cl 11.7 of the PMT Partner Agreement Australia. 153 With respect to the third and fourth alleged bases for a stay, neither raised issues concerning international commercial arbitration under which an analysis of pro-arbitration judicial policy (or Eisenwerk) becomes relevant.
Article 8(1) of the Model Law, like IAA s 7(5), contains an exception to the requirement of a stay where the arbitration agreement is 'inoperative or incapable of being performed'. On the basis of cl 11.7 of the PMT Partner Agreement Australia, this was fatal to the IAA s 7 argument. 154 The art 8 Model Law argument could have been dismissed for the same reason. However, instead, Refshauge J invoked Eisenwerk as the reason for the claim's failure. 155 Referring 158 Thus it was held that 'the parties have agreed … to proceed other than in accordance with the Model Law'. 159 Consequently, art 8 of the Model Law was held to be inapplicable. 160 This decision is troubling from a pro-arbitration judicial policy perspective. First, it does not make any reference to the IAA s 2D statutory objects. This is not just a matter of good practice -it is required of courts performing 'functions' or 'exercising … _____________________________________________________________________________________ 151 Ibid 79 [93] . 152 Ibid 91 [173] . Naturally, the relevance of each in a given case will depend on the instruments at issue. 164 Thus notwithstanding the date of judgment, from a practical perspective, Lightsource might be thought of as the first in time in this line of five cases and as (in essence) a case pre-dating the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth). Even if this perspective is taken and the IAA s 2D issue is put to one side, critiques from a pro-arbitration judicial policy perspective remain. For example, the decision contains no critical assessment of Eisenwerk. This is surprising given the decision's infamy, the close scrutiny it has received in the academic literature, and the fact that two Australian superior courts had within the previous 12 months come to very different conclusions regarding its precedential value.
Further, and perhaps most fundamentally, pro-arbitration judicial policy is demonstrably lacking in Lightsource given the Court's failure to contextualise the old IAA s 21's operation against the sphere of applicability of the Model Law. To demonstrate this point, an analysis of that scope is required. Though the analysis is technical, had it been undertaken by the Court, the relevance of art 8 of the Model Law would not have been dismissed (at least, not for the reasons given); the reach of the old IAA s 21 would have been narrowed; and pro-arbitration judicial policy would have been furthered.
Lex arbitri are generally conceived of as being territorial in their application. 165 In other words, they apply as the baseline procedural law governing an international commercial arbitration if that arbitration is seated within the relevant State. 166 The Model Law operates in this fashion. As a general rule, its application is territorial in the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 161 168 Article 8 of the Model Law is thus able to be applied by an Australian court -to refer litigating parties back to arbitration -even if the seat of arbitration is not Australia. This is a logical consequence of the provision's purpose. Securing compliance with arbitration agreements would be frustrated if a party could unilaterally choose to litigate outside the arbitral seat with impunity. Article 8 of the Model Law, and the other provisions mentioned as exceptions to the general rule in art 1(2) of the Model Law, can be viewed as a discrete part of the Model Law having operation independent of the Model Law acting as lex arbitri. Thus, should the Model Law not apply, these specific provisions must still be able to be invoked by an Australian court. This is true where, as is envisaged by art 1(2) of the Model Law, the seat of arbitration is outside Australia. 169 It is argued here to also be true where, under the old IAA s 21, the parties displace the Model Law's application (whether by virtue of a genuine agreement or through the operation of Eisenwerk).
In Lightsource, the seat of arbitration was Sweden and the adoption of the SCC Expedited Rules led the Court to invoke the old IAA s 21 (on the basis of Eisenwerk). Neither of these facts preclude the operation of art 8 of the Model Law. Applying proarbitration judicial policy, as required by IAA s 39 and a consideration of the IAA s 2D statutory objects, should have led the ACT Supreme Court to this conclusion and should have led it to assess whether art 8 of the Model Law required a stay (though given the Court's decision with respect to IAA s 7, the answer would most likely still have been no).
D
Enter the Amendments Before considering Castel and Rizhao Steel, the final two cases relevant to Eisenwerk's continued applicability, a further factor must be injected into this paper's analysisthe legislative reforms effected to the IAA through the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth). These reforms directly touch on the Eisenwerk point and were the subject of consideration in both Castel and Rizhao Steel, which are analysed in Sections E and F below.
Following the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), the power of parties to opt out of the Model Law has been removed. 170 The old IAA s 21, which has so far been the focus of analysis in this paper, has been replaced. The new IAA s 21, which sits under the heading 'Model Law covers the field', now provides that:
If the Model Law applies to an arbitration, the law of a State or Territory relating to arbitration does not apply to that arbitration. This new IAA s 21 is radically different to the old, and effects two distinct policy decisions. One is to ensure that all international commercial arbitrations seated in _____________________________________________________________________________________ 167 Model Law art 1(2). 168 What remained ambiguous however was the temporal reach of the new IAA s 21. Despite quite detailed regulation of the time at which many amending clauses in the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) take effect, 174 there is nothing in the Act which clarifies the point in time at which the new IAA s 21 is operative. 175 Early commentary operated on the assumption that the new IAA s 21 would operate only in relation to arbitration agreements entered into after the date on which the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) received royal assent 176 -being 6 July 2010. 177 However, after further analysis, an important complication was discovered -the ____________________________________________________________________________________ spectre of the 'black hole' arbitration. 178 If the new IAA s 21 only applies to arbitration agreements entered into after 6 July 2010, it is possible that a pre-existing arbitration agreement could still (pursuant to the old IAA s 21) exclude the Model Law but at the same time not be governed by the relevant State or Territory Commercial Arbitration Act as the new State and Territory regimes operate immediately (irrespective of when an arbitration agreement is concluded), 179 and do not apply to international commercial arbitrations. 180 Thus, despite enactment of the new IAA s 21, questions remain over the continued applicability of the old IAA s 21 (and thus by implication the continued applicability of Eisenwerk) where an arbitration agreement was concluded before 6 July 2010. Statistical data published by the International Chamber of Commerce demonstrates that there are often a number of years (sometimes a great number of years) between the conclusion of an arbitration agreement and the initiation of proceedings, 181 confirming the practical importance of this issue.
E
Castel -The Federal Court of Australia These questions were explored by the Federal Court of Australia in Castel, a decision handed down by Murphy J on 23 January 2012. Castel did not examine the Eisenwerk principle per se, though it did address the temporal reach of the new IAA s 21 and in doing so indirectly addressed the continued applicability of Eisenwerk. The decision, which concerned a challenge to the Federal Court's jurisdiction to enforce a nonforeign award 182 pursuant to the IAA and the Model Law, was based on an application of s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 183 with Murphy J's analysis of the new IAA s 21 strictly constituting obiter dicta. 184 Nonetheless, the Court's analysis is instructive in the quest to assess whether the end of Eisenwerk has finally come (and the
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the core dispute over the jurisdiction in relation to art 35 of the Model Law to enforce a non-foreign award, the Court noted that the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic) does not apply, leading Murphy J to remark 'I very much doubt that the Federal, State and Territory parliaments intend the result that no court is specified as "competent" to do so [ie. exercise jurisdiction to enforce non-foreign international arbitral awards]'. 202 
F
Rizhao Steel -The Western Australian Court of Appeal On 9 March 2012, shortly after the jurisdictional decision in Castel, the Western Australian Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in Rizhao Steel. In that case, Rizhao Steel challenged the Supreme Court's decision at first instance to enforce arbitral awards that had been made against it in favour of Koolan Iron Ore Pty Ltd and Mount Gibson Mining Ltd. 203 The case raised jurisdictional issues as to whether the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) or alternatively the IAA provided the legal basis for the enforcement order. 204 It was 'common ground' prior to the Court of Appeal proceedings that the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA) applied. 205 However, on appeal, Rizhao Steel argued that an enforcement order could only be made under the IAA. The Court of Appeal 'was thus faced with the same question as in Castel: does the new [IAA] s 21 apply to pre-6 July 2010 arbitration agreements?' 206 A peculiar feature of Rizhao Steel which differentiated it factually from Castel was that the relevant arbitration agreement pre-dated 6 July 2010, but so did commencement of the arbitration -with proceedings almost being concluded by that date. 207 The case was ultimately decided on the procedural basis that it was not open to Rizhao Steel to argue a new point (previously withheld for forensic advantage) on appeal. 208 Nevertheless, like Murphy J in Castel, the Court went on to analyse the IAA s 21 issue in obiter dicta. 209 Two distinct strands of reasoning are evident in the Court's judgments. Martin CJ, Buss JA and Murphy JA: all … agreed that the amended s 21 did not have retrospective effect where the dispute had been referred to arbitration prior to 6 July 2010 pursuant to a pre-6 July 2010 arbitration agreement in which the parties had selected the CAA as their lex arbitri. 210
However, 'the court was divided as to whether the new [IAA] s 21 applied to a pre-6 July 2010 arbitration agreement where arbitration proceedings had not been
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Volume 41 ____________________________________________________________________________________ statutory construction concerning retrospectivity. That point is, however, not necessary to decide in this case. 222 While the pro-arbitration judicial policy features of Castel were limited, the Rizhao Steel Court's analysis was even more domestically-focused. It is difficult to detect any elements of Martin CJ's leading judgment or Murphy JA's additional remarks that flavour the Court's reasoning with pro-arbitration judicial policy. In particular, Martin CJ considered that the extrinsic materials relied upon in Castel were not of any assistance 223 and also 'rejected' the contextual relevance of IAA s 30. 224 Nevertheless, commentary has recognised the intuitive appeal of Murphy JA's approach, with Monichino and Fawke arguing that it 'is to be preferred (to the view of the majority, and also to the view in Castel), from both a statutory interpretation and a policy perspective'. 225 
V LESSONS LEARNED -THE PLACE OF PRO-ARBITRATION JUDICIAL POLICY IN THE AUSTRALIAN COURTS
What can be learned from this paper's analysis? With respect to Eisenwerk, the best conclusion that can be drawn on the current state of the authorities is that the infamous principle has possibly come to an end. In Cargill International the Court, constituted by Ward J, expressly said as much -holding that Eisenwerk was 'plainly wrong' and should not be followed in New South Wales. 226 227 As established in Part II, pro-arbitration judicial policy is a required element of legal reasoning when applying the IAA and is also a requirement at international law with respect to the New York Convention's pro-enforcement bias. It is interesting to observe that the two decisions analysed in Part IV imposing the greatest obstacles for Eisenwerk's continued applicability -Cargill International and Castel -do display evidence of pro-arbitration judicial policy (the former moreso than the latter). Conversely, Wagners and Lightsource lack a solid pro-arbitration judicial policy focus and unsurprisingly are two decisions that fail to create distance from the Eisenwerk holding.
While the pro-arbitration effect of a judgment is necessarily a different concept to the use of pro-arbitration judicial policy, in four of the five cases analysed in Part IV the two coincide. Those Courts making use, as the law requires, of pro-arbitration
